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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent, )

vs.
EFRAIN M. VILLARREAL,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

)

Priority No. 2

)

Case No. 920730-CA

)

INTRODUCTION
The Briefs of Appellant and Appellee have been filed in,
or transferred to, this Court. Pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant files this Reply Brief
in response to the Appellee's Brief, which raises new issues.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The facts in the instant case have been previously
addressed by the parties in their respective opening briefs. The
facts are also presented at the beginning of each Point in the
Argument section of this Brief.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The statutes and constitutional provisions relevant to
determining this case have been reproduced in Appendix 1 of Brief
of Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STANDARD FOR RESOLVING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL CLAIMS IS WHETHER COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FALLS
BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS, AND NOT
WHETHER COUNSEL GROSSLY DEVIATED FROM PROPER TRIAL COURT
PRACTICE.
The State has propounded what it believes is a new
standard for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in
cases where the issue is "presented solely on the record of an
appealed-from

conviction."

It argues that

f!

[t]he

'deficient

performance' element of an ineffective counsel claim should require
defendant to show a gross deviation, clear on the record, from
proper trial court practice."

Appellee's Br. 20.

This Court, as well as the overwhelming

number of

appellate courts, has never required an ineffective of counsel
claimant to demonstrate that counsel grossly deviated from normal
trial court practice.

The rule has been, and should continue to

be:
To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a defendant must show that
- 2 -

(i) counsel's performance was deficient in some
demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and
(ii) there is a reasonable probability that but for
the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding
would have been more favorable to the defendant.
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct- App. 1991); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v.
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

The State's novel

theory, which, in essence, heightens the threshold requirement for
claimants raising ineffective assistance for the first time on
appeal, should summarily be rejected.1
1

In addition, to the extent that the State insinuates that
Villarreal's appellate counsel was somehow negligent for not
seeking a trial court remand on the ineffectiveness claim under
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Appellee's Br. 20
n.7, counsel moves to strike that portion of the State's brief.
Rule 23B became effective October 1, 1992, the date on which
Villarreal's Supplemental Opening Brief was filed in the Supreme
Court. See In re Proposed Amendments to Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, No. 920253 (S.Ct. August 10, 1992). Apart from the fact
that Rule 23 was not in effect when Villarreal filed his briefs,
the evidence pertinent to disposing this case are so clear on the
record, such that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary.
Counsel takes this opportunity to admonish the Attorney
General's Office to litigate its cases, particularly criminal
cases, in such a way that the State taxpayers do not incur
unnecessary expenses. The instant case presents a perfect example
of how the Attorney General's Office, Criminal Division, could
enmesh fiscal conservatism into its litigation strategy. Here, the
trial record is adequately developed for disposing of Villarreal's
ineffectiveness claim. Yet, the State would prefer another hearing
in the court below, which hearing, counsel submits, would only
produce a record similar to that currently before this Court.
- 3-

POINT II
VILLARREAL HAS COHERENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS
PREJUDICED BY COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE.
On
11

page

29

of

its

brief,

the

State

claims

that

[d]efendant does not coherently attempt to show that he was

prejudiced by counsel's alleged jury selection miscues.
he urges this Court to presume prejudice. . . . "

Instead,

It is true that,

relying on Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988), Villarreal urges a presumption of
prejudice, on the ground that no trial strategy allows counsel to
sit two jurors who were inferentially biased because of their
personal or familial experience as victims of sexual assault -- the
same crime

for which Villarreal was tried.2

That argument,

however, was an alternate to Villarreal's other argument that,
under the standard enunciated by this Court in Woolley, he was

(footnote 1, cont'd)

Further, in several places in its brief, the State urges this
Court to not address some of the issues raised by Villarreal
because they were not preserved for appeal or because the trial
court did not rule on them. See, e.g. , Appellee's Br. 19, 45.
That those issue were not properly ruled upon and/or preserved for
appeal is the essence of Villarreal's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective.
2

See State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); Appellee's Br. 28.
- 4 -

clearly prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge five jurors
for cause in this case where the
overwhelming.

evidence against him was not

See Appellant's Opening Br. 21; Appellant's Supp.

Br. 14, 19.
POINT III
REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS IN DISMISSED COUNTS WERE OVERLY
PREJUDICIAL AND COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THEM
RENDERED HIS PERFORMANCE DEFICIENT.
The State concedes that references at Villarreal's trial
to evidence of anal sodomy and rape, which counts had been
dismissed at preliminary hearing, were improper under Rules 402,
403, and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Appellee's Br. 3637.

The State goes on, however, to defend trial counsel, claiming

that counsel's performance in not objecting to the admission of the
evidence was "professionally []acceptable," because counsel made a
strategic choice that "the references were not overly problematic."
Appellee's Br. 37.
The State's inability to recognize the problem associated
with the admission of such damaging evidence, see Appellee's Br.
37, also explains its inability to comprehend why " [defendant's
explanation of the significance of preliminary hearing," Appellee's
Br. 36, is germane to the question whether counsel's performance
was

constitutionally

acceptable.

First,

a

constitutionally

acceptable defense counsel does not sit by and allow dismissed
- 5 -

allegations to be introduced against his or client.

Cf. State v.

Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990) (counsel's failure to
object

to

prejudicial

reasonable).

expert

testimony

was

not

objectively

Second, that those damaging allegations were allowed

to resurface at trial without counsel's objection is the basis for
Villarreal's claim that his preliminary hearing right as well as
his right to a surprise-free trial were inadequately safeguarded,
since he was not on notice that the State would attempt to
prejudice the jury with those allegations.

See, e.g., State v.

Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988) (defendant could not be
convicted of allegations that had been dismissed at preliminary
hearing).

Counsel's inadvertance in allowing clearly prejudicial

evidence to be introduced by the State can hardly be seen as the
making of a strategic choice.

If it is harmful, any competent

trial counsel would object to its introduction, especially before
a jury.
POINT IV
ADMISSION OF BLAKE BEDIENT'S CONFESSION AGAINST
VILLARREAL VIOLATED VILLARREAL'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
A.

Confrontation Clause Violation;
The State argues that the admission of the confession of

Blake Bedient, Villarreal's alleged accomplice, was proper under
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 804(b)(3),
- 6 -

Utah Rules of Evidence.

As the argument goes, since he had been

separately tried and convicted,
Bedient was no more than an ordinary witness of the
events in question [at Villarreal's trial]. Therefore,
the confrontation clause problems inhering in the use of
a co-defendant's confession at a joint trial, see Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986), and Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968), were not presented
by Bedient's testimony. See United States v. Smith, 432
F.2d 1109, 1111 (7th Cir. 1970), and Faulkner v. State,
646 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Okla. 1982). . . .
Appellee's Br. 53.
Villarreal understands the State's argument to be thus:
that a confrontation clause issue could only surface at a joint
trial of codefendants or accomplices.
part

of

the

State

is clearly

Such a conclusion on the

erroneous

and misleading.

A

confrontation clause problem could arise, and has arisen, at
separate

trials

inadmissible,

of accomplices.

because

of

And

confrontation

accomplice's confession against another.

the courts have found
clause

problems, one

See, e.g., State v.

Watts, 452 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Standifur,
526 A.2d 955 (Md. 1987).
Thus, because he was an accomplice, Bedient clearly was
more than "an ordinary witness" during Villarreal's trial. He was
an accomplice whose hearsay confession was admitted against a
criminal defendant, in violation of the confrontation clause.
Villarreal certainly had no way to meaningfully cross-examine
- 7-

Bedient who, as the State acknowledged, "mostly persisted in his
refusal

to answer

[questions]."

Appellee's Br. 54.

It is

axiomatic that a declarant who refuses to testify is unavailable
for confrontation clause purposes.

See United States v. Barlow,

693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).

As

such, analysis of Bedient's confession should have begun "with the
presumption that such confessions are not firmly rooted and are
inadmissible against the defendant except upon a particularized
guarantee of reliability."

Comment, Of Confrontation: The Right

Not To Be Convicted On the Hearsay Declarations of An Accomplice,
1990 Utah L. Rev. 855, 878 ("Comment").

No such finding of

particularized guarantee of trustworthiness was accomplished in
this case. See Standifur, 526 A.2d at 955 (analyzing factors to be
considered

in

confession).

determining

reliability

of

accomplice's

Therefore, the admission of Bedient's confession

violated Villarreal's right of confrontation.
B.

an

See id.

Admission of the Confession under Rule 804(bW3) is
Unconstitutional:
The State also defends the trial court's admission of

Bedient's confession against Villarreal under Rule 804(b)(3), which
is the statement against penal interest hearsay exception.
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

See

It argues that Rule 804(b)(3) represents

such a "firmly-rooted hearsay exception," such that the proponent
- 8 -

of the evidence need not demonstrate the statement's -- here -- the
confession's, reliability.
After
commentator

an

Appellee's Br. 55.

in-depth

has noted

that

study
"[t]he

of

Rule

804(b)(3)/

one

[Supreme] Court has never

considered declarations against penal interest as a 'firmly-rooted"
hearsay exception[,]" and that Rule 804(b)(3) is plagued with
numerous constitutional deficiencies.

See Comment/ at 877; see

also Olsen v. Green, 688 F.2d 421/ 427 n.ll (8th Cir.) (statements
against

penal

interest

"do

not constitute

a well-recognized

exception to the hearsay rules"), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 1009
(1982); Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the
Confrontation Clause, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 159/ 162 (1983) (statements
against penal interest "were not well received at common law in
either English or American courts").

Indeed/ the Supreme Court

rejected the prosecution's characterization of the hearsay involved
in Lee "as a simple 'declaration against penal interest.'

That

concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation
Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by
an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant."

Lee v.

Illinois, 476 U.S. 530/ 544 n.5 (1986) (emphasis added).
Again, the State's conclusion that the confrontation
clause and/or Lee allows the admission of Bedient's confession

- 9-

against Villarreal under Rule 804(b)(3) is erroneous.3

First, it

is unclear whether Bedient's statement to the police was in fact a
non-collateral, against-interest confession under Rule 804.

The

confession was made in police custody, under circumstances in which
Bedient had a motive to curry favor.

See Standifur, 526 A.2d at

959-60 (confessions which implicate declarant and third party,
particularly

when

inadmissible

because

interest).

made

Second,

not
the

in

police

actually

custody,
against

confession

are

generally

declarant's

was

not

penal

sufficiently

corroborated by circumstances surrounding its making. See id. ; see
also Comment, at 896 (confession not corroborated by totality of
surrounding circumstances is inadmissible).
In short, the State did not even meet the threshold
requirement for admitting an unavailable declarant's confession
under Rule 804(b)(3).

Even if the State met that standard, the

admission in this case of Bedient's confession under Rule 804(b)(3)
violated Villarreal's confrontation rights. See Watts. 452 N.W.2d
at 731 (declaration against interest may comport with evidentiary
rule and yet violate the confrontation clause).
3

To the extent that State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), found no confrontation clause problems in admitting
an accomplice's confession against a criminal defendant under Rule
804(b)(3), Villarreal urges this Court to overrule it as
inconsistent with Lee. See also Comment, at 892-94 (arguing that
Drawn was incorrectly decided and urging that it be overruled).
- 10 -

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT COULD NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONALLY
ADMITTED BEDIENT'S CONFESSION UNDER RULE 801(d)(1)(A),
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
To minimize the prejudice to Villarreal, the State argues
that the district court adequately protected him by reducing the
impact of Bedient's confession:
Because Bedient denied that he had inculpated the
defendant when he confessed to Hodgkinson, the trial
court could have admitted the detective's report to the
contrary as Bedient's non-hearsay prior inconsistent
statement, under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of
Evidence. By excluding that portion of the Bedient's
confession that directly inculpated defendant, the
prosecution was denied powerful substantive evidence.
Appellee's Br. 56.
The state is entirely mistaken in assuming that Bedient's
confession was admissible as a Rule 801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent
statement.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), like its

counterpart in 804(b)(3), does not give adequate consideration to
the confrontation clause.

The Advisory Committee note to Rule

801(d)(1)(A) recognizes the confrontation clause problem inherent
in the rule under California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).4
4

See

In Green, the Supreme Court permitted the admission at trial
of a prior inconsistent statement of a preliminary hearing witness
against a criminal defendant.
The Court found the testimony
constitutionally admissible because the witness had testified under
oath and was subject to cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing. See Green, 399 U.S. at 165. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A),
on the other hand, allows for the admission of extrajudicial
statements not made under oath as prior inconsistent statement.
- 11 -

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801, reprinted in Utah Court Rules
Annotated p. 584 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992).
Cognizant of the Court's decision in Green# the drafters
of

the Federal

Rules of Evidence

"allows only

those

[prior

inconsistent statements] made while the declarant was subject to
cross-examination at a trial or hearing or in a deposition, to be
admissible for their truth1' under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).5

See Notes

of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 93-650,
reprinted in Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.11, p. 722
(2d ed.

1986)

("Graham");

see also Notes of the Conference

Committee, House Report, No. 93-1597, reprinted in Graham, at 72324.

See, e.g., United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.

1986)

("Several

circuits

have

already

incorporated

the

congressional intent into decisions that have refused to admit
statements given under informal circumstances tantamount to a
station house interrogation setting which later prove inconsistent

5

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), provides:
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if -(1) Prior Statements by Witness.
The declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, or in a deposition, . . .
- 12 -

with

a

declarant's

trial

testimony

and

have

denied

their

admissibility as substantive evidence pursuant to 801(d)(1)(A).
•

•

•

i •

Utah's Rule 801(d)(1)(A), on the other hand, deviates
from the federal rule and provides for the admission of prior
inconsistent statement even if, as here, the declarant did not make
the

extrajudicial

statement

under

oath,

subject

to

cross-

examination. Compare Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) with Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(A).

The problems associated with Utah's approach is

succinctly described by Professor Graham as follows:
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as promulgated by the Advisory
Committee and prescribed by the Supreme Court, required
only that the declarant be present at trial, give
testimony, and be subject to cross-examination as to the
prior inconsistent statement.
Under Proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(A), oral and written statements not made at
formal proceedings would have been included. Thus prior
inconsistent statements outside the scope of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) but within the proposed rule include oral
and written statements of witnesses made to investigators
for insurance companies and police officers.
The
reliability of such statements is suspect, i.e., they are
often biased as a result of subtle influence, coercion or
deceit on the part of the person eliciting the statement.
See, e.g., Statement by Herbert Semmell, Hearings on H.R.
5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
2d Sess. 302 (1974) :
The problems of inaccurate repetition,
ambiguity and incompleteness of out-of-court
statements may be found in both written and
oral statements, although the problem is more
acute in oral statements.
But written
statements are also subject to distortion. We
are all familiar with the way a skilled
investigator, be he a lawyer, police officer,
- 13 -

insurance claim agent, or private detective,
can listen to a potential witness and then
prepare a statement for signature by the
witness which reflects the interest of the
investigator's client or agency.
Adverse
details are omitted; subtle changes of
emphasis are made. It is regrettable but true
that some lawyers will distort the truth to
win a case and that some police officers will
do the same to "solve" a crime, particularly
one which has aroused the public interest or
caused public controversy.
Or the police
officer may be seeking to put away a
"dangerous criminal" who the officer "knows"
is guilty but against whom evidence is
lacking.
See also Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762 n. 13
(8th Cir. 1967) :
Today the art of statement taking is a
recognized science. Inbau & Reid, Criminal
Interrogation & Confessions (1962); Schwartz,
Trial of Automobile Accident Cases, Vol. I, §
4, pp. 5, 6, "Requisites of Witnesses
Statements,"
3rd
ed.
(1965);
Smithson,
Insurance Law Journal, June, 1958, "Liability
Claims
and
Litigation,"
pp.
375-403;
Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice, Vol.
I, § 30, p. 58, "Securing Statements from
Witnesses" (1954); Donaldson Casualty Claims
Practice, "Richard D. Erwin Series in Risk &
Insurance" (1964), pp. 481-500; Averback,
Handling Accident Cases, Vol. 2, p. 269
(1958). Whether the problem be one of fault
in communication to a good faith interrogator
or culpable strategy of the examiner, is
immaterial. The fact remains, most ex parte
statements reflect the subjective interest and
attitude of the examiner as well.
With respect to statements not made at formal
proceedings, the danger also exists that the asserted
existence of the prior statement may be a fabrication.
Implicitly rejected in this argument is the view that
examination of either the declarant when he testifies in
- 14 -

court or the witness presenting extrinsic proof of the
prior inconsistent statement will successfully expose a
fabrication or bring to light any illegitimate influence
that acted to color the declarant's prior statement. For
further discussion of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), see Graham,
Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as
Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed
Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613
and 607, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1565 (1977).
Graham, p. 732 n.13.
As such, as it currently stands, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah
R. Evid., does not pass muster under the confrontation clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article
1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Consequently, contrary to
the

State's

assertion,

the

district

court

could

not

have

constitutionally admitted Bedient's hearsay against Villarreal
under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Independently

or cumulatively, counsel's

failure to

competently represent Villarreal's interest as discussed above
require a reversal. Further, the trial court erroneously admitted
several damaging evidence against Villarreal.

This Court should

reverse Villarreal's conviction and remand this case for a new
trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of December, 1992.

RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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